Institutions Of Horizontal Accountability Research Articles

Civil Society Under Attack: The Consequences for Horizontal Accountability Institutions

AbstractExisting research shows that the activity of independent civil society organizations (CSOs) is an important ingredient of democratization and democratic consolidation. Yet, what happens when governments impose restrictions on CSO activity? This manuscript investigates how restrictions on CSOs affect the quality of horizontal accountability institutions like parliaments and courts. CSOs monitor and mobilize against violations of democratic norms. Thus, if governments impose restrictions on CSO activity, they may face fewer barriers (i.e., less scrutiny and criticism) to dismantling horizontal checks and balances. In addition, when restrictions prevent CSOs from supporting horizontal accountability institutions (e.g., with monitoring and expertise), the latter’s ability to control and constrain governments likely declines. Our large-N cross-country analysis supports this argument, suggesting that the imposition of restrictions on CSOs diminishes the quality of horizontal accountability institutions. We examine alternative explanations (i.e., prior autocratization trends and the authoritarian nature of governments) and offer qualitative evidence from Kenya and Turkey to illustrate the expected causal pathways. Our results imply that a crackdown on CSOs serves as a warning sign of deteriorating horizontal oversight.

Partisanship, elite messages, and support for populism in power

AbstractDiscontent is seen as a critical driver for the appeal of populism, yet studies have typically focused on cases of populism in opposition. We argue that scholars’ emphasis on populism in opposition led them to overlook the roles of elite messages and partisanship in the adoption of populist attitudes. Drawing on theories of elite-driven public opinion, we contend that populist attitudes do not need to be rooted in discontent. In cases of populism in power, those who are more satisfied politically and economically, and partisans of the ruling party should display higher levels of populist attitudes. We provide observational and experimental survey evidence in this direction from Turkey, where a populist party has long been in power. We also find that the dominant characteristic of support for populism in power is an emphasis on popular sovereignty at the expense of institutions of horizontal accountability.

Institutional development and public control: Analyzing the Brazilian accountability system.

This paper aims to analyze the institutional development process of accountability institutions in Brazil. Scholars have identified an incremental development process of horizontal accountability institutions in Brazil, stimulating an important process in democracy. Our argument is that the incremental development process of accountability institutions was not followed by systemic developments able to encompass all accountability institutions. The reason for this is that, in spite of incremental advances, there has been no development regarding the procedural ecology of accountability institutions, thus hampering coordinated and cooperative actions between institutions. We analyzed the procedural flow from the Public Sweepstakes Program of the Comptroller General in Brazil as well as the performance of the institutions of the accountability system. We also conducted interviews with the leaders of accountability institutions in order to address the issue of cooperation and strategic coordination of the system of institutions.

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

Accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance. Establishing accountable governments is a top priority on the international development agenda. Yet, scholars and democracy practitioners know little about how accountability mechanisms develop and thus can be supported by international and national actors. The present study tackles the questions of how, and in what sequence accountability sub-types develop. We consider not only vertical (elections and political parties) and horizontal accountability (legislature, judiciary, and other oversight bodies) but also diagonal accountability (civil society and media) in both their de-jure and the de-facto dimensions. By utilizing novel sequencing methods, we study their sequential relationships in 173 countries from 1900 to the present with data from the new V-Dem dataset. Considering the long-term dimensions of institution building, this study indicates that most aspects of de-facto vertical accountability precede other forms of accountability. Effective institutions of horizontal accountability—such as vigorous parliaments and independent high courts—evolve rather late in the sequence and build on progress in many other areas.

The politics of policy stability: explaining the levels of volatility in economic policymaking in Argentina and Brazil between 1990 and 2010

ABSTRACTThis article will examine economic policy stability in Argentina and Brazil, where by “policy stability” I refer to “the level of fluctuation in policies”. Countries in which policies change frequently would be characterized as having low policy stability, whereas countries which maintain a consistent set of laws over a long period of time would be deemed to have high policy stability. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, whereas Brazil demonstrated a very high degree of policy stability, Argentina was characterized by highly volatile, constantly fluctuating economic policies. I analyze two root causes of this divergence in policy stability between these countries: the strength of institutions of horizontal accountability, and the levels of fragmentation in the party systems. I will show in this article that the higher levels of policy stability in Brazil were the result of: a) a stronger congress and judiciary (these institutions were considerably weaker in Argentina); and b) a significantly more fragmented party system (the party system was less fragmented in Argentina). After linking these two independent variables to policy stability on a theoretical level, I will use a case study to illustrate this correlation, namely pension reform.

The Accountability Sequence: From De-jure to De-facto Constraints on Governments

Accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance. Establishing accountable governments is a top priority on the international development agenda. Yet, scholars and democracy practitioners know little about how accountability mechanisms develop and thus can be supported by international and national actors. The present study tackles the questions of how, and in what sequence accountability sub-types develop. We consider not only vertical (elections and political parties) and horizontal accountability (legislature, judiciary and other oversight bodies), but also diagonal accountability (civil society and media) in both their de-jure and the de-facto dimensions. By utilizing novel sequencing methods, we study their sequential relationships in 173 countries from 1900 to the present with data from the new V-Dem dataset. Considering the long-term dimensions of institution building, this study indicates that most aspects of de-facto vertical accountability precede other forms of accountability. Effective institutions of horizontal accountability – such as vigorous parliaments and independent high courts – evolve rather late in the sequence and build on progress in many other areas.

Can Politicians Police Themselves? Natural Experimental Evidence From Brazil’s Audit Courts

To enhance government accountability, reformers have advocated strengthening institutions of “horizontal accountability,” particularly auditing institutions that can punish lawbreaking elected officials. Yet, these institutions differ in their willingness to punish corrupt politicians, which is often attributed to variation in their degree of independence from the political branches. Taking advantage of a randomized natural experiment embedded in Brazil’s State Audit Courts, we study how variation in the appointment mechanisms for choosing auditors affects political accountability. We show that auditors appointed under few constraints by elected officials punish lawbreaking politicians—particularly co-partisans—at lower rates than bureaucrats insulated from political influence. In addition, we find that even when executives are heavily constrained in their appointment of auditors by meritocratic and professional requirements, auditors still exhibit a pro-politician bias in decision making. Our results suggest that removing bias requires a level of insulation from politics rare among institutions of horizontal accountability.

The Limits of the European Union's Transformative Power: Pathologies of Europeanization and Rule of Law Reform in Central and Eastern Europe

This thesis examines the impact of the European Union (EU) on the development of the rule of law in Central and Eastern Europe. The topic is addressed through a mixed methods study which consists of a quantitative comparative analysis of three country groups from Central and Eastern Europe (1. Central Europe and the Baltics, CEB; 2. South Eastern Europe, SEE; 3.Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS) and three qualitative case studies on Poland, Romania and Moldova. The empirical analysis is based on an innovative set of indicators and revealing insights from numerous qualitative interviews.The findings of the study suggest that the impact of the EU is differential, both healthy and pathological. While EU-driven judicial reforms increase judicial capacity and align domestic legislation with European and international standards (substantive legality), they do not improve and even lead to a deterioration of judicial impartiality and formal legality, resulting in several reform pathologies, such as instable, incoherent and non-enforced laws and in more politicized and incoherent judicial systems, which undermine the development of the rule of law. These pathological effects occur mostly in weak rule of law countries from SEE (Romania) and CIS (Moldova), in contrast to more healthy effects in advanced, strong rule of law countries from CEB (Poland).The dissimilar development in the rule of law across countries is explained in relation to the conduct of reforms. Successful reformers like Poland, which consolidate the rule of law, have strong and independent horizontal accountability institutions (e.g. Constitutional Court, Ombudsman, judiciary), which mitigate or alleviate reform pathologies and ensure that reforms are conducted in an accountable, gradual and non-politicized way. Unsuccessful reformers, like Romania and Moldova, lack these independent checks on reformers and thus fail to establish the rule of law. Based on the findings from the case studies an original typology of healthy and pathological reform paths is proposed, which draws on the logic of circular and cumulative causation and emphasizes the mutual reinforcement between domestic conditions and the reform approach of transnational coalitions. The proposed typology implies that EU conditionality is not transformative, but rather reinforces existing healthy and pathological reform paths, thus cementing the existing divergence in the rule of law across post-communist countries. This thesis further makes several policy recommendations to remedy the pathological impact of donor-driven reforms.

Horizontal accountability and the challenges for democratic consolidation in Africa: evidence from Liberia

ABSTRACTWhy are most African emerging democracies failing to consolidate and reach the two-turnover test? Most scholars attribute this to the poor quality of elections and limited institutionalization of vertical accountability, overlooking some important variables. This article challenges this conception both theoretically and empirically by focusing on the quality of horizontal accountability illustrated by observations of comparative interest in Liberia's emerging democracy. Since the end of Liberia's bloody civil war in 2003, two successive and successful democratic elections (2005 and 2011) have been organized, putting Liberia on the path towards democratic consolidation. When analysing the electoral mechanism of vertical2016 accountability, many scholars have been enthusiastic about the prospects of democratic consolidation in Liberia, most of them neglecting the horizontal accountability processes that are also crucial for the quality and durability of democracy. This article analyses the processes and challenges of democratic consolidation in Liberia by focusing on key institutions of horizontal accountability. It argues that although the country has made some progress towards democratization since 2005, the domination and centralization of executive power, weak and dependent institutions of horizontal accountability (legislature, judiciary, national elections commission, general auditing commission, and anti-corruption commission) are major challenges to the consolidation of democracy. These findings have important implications for our understanding of horizontal accountability and democratic consolidation in African emerging democracies.

Promoting empowerment? The World Bank's Village Investment Project in Kyrgyzstan

This article examines the extent to which the World Bank's community-driven Village Investment Project empowered people to influence the choice of local investments (micro-projects) and to exact accountability from their leaders. It is based on qualitative interviews and group discussions in 16 rural communities. The research demonstrates that the project provided an effective mechanism for responsive infrastructure delivery to address local priority needs. However, it did not improve accountability either within or outside the micro-project boundaries. The project's bottom-up development model was not by itself sufficient to enable people to exercise power over local government officials and informal leaders in the absence of effective horizontal accountability institutions within the state.

Overseeing Oversight: The Logic of Appointments to Brazilian State Audit Courts

Horizontal accountability institutions are designed by the state to oversee itself. When are these institutions more or less likely to work as an effective check on government malfeasance? Focusing on appointed councilors who head subnational audit courts, we develop some preliminary hypotheses about when such auditors are likely to be most independent of executive branch influence. Then, using a new dataset on the current and historical composition of Brazil’s state audit courts (TCEs), we document some new facts about the identities of the audit court councilors and test hypotheses about the conditions under which different types of councilors are likely to be selected. Our preliminary results suggest that higher quality councilors are selected during election years and by the executive branch. They also suggest that further work should focus on the role of the legislature in the politicization of TCEs — both in selecting councilors and determining the length of their service. This raises some interesting questions about whether institutional reforms aimed to curb executive political interference merely displace political interference to the legislative branch.

State Strategies of Resisting Social Accountability

This article contributes to growing research about the emergence of the rule of law, or horizontal accountability, still a salient difference between Western institutionalized democracies and the new democracies in post-communist Eurasia. Recent research has theorized “social accountability” as a possible mechanism linking public campaigning by civic associations with the activation of institutions of horizontal accountability. By reviewing the recent public campaigns of various associations in post-Soviet Ukraine, this article “turns the lens” of such research by focusing less on the characteristics of the civil society actors mobilizing to bring about accountability and more on the state itself. It argues that the prospects for horizontal accountability have to be judged against a wide range of containment measures that states attempt in order to demobilize public opposition to their policies. Such measures operate through “twisted legality,” a set of measures policing protests through means that are largely legal but specifically target protesters in ways that could not function were state powers indeed separated (for instance, if the police apparatus were to operate on the basis of legal mandates issued by independent courts). Furthermore, the goal of policing actions is to push protesters “out of legality,” in ways that I describe below.

Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes

Although military rule disappeared in Latin America after 1990, other forms of authoritarianism persisted. Competitive authoritarianism, in which democratic institutions exist but incumbent abuse skews the playing field against opponents, emerged in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador during the post-Cold War period. This article seeks to explain the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. It argues that populism – the election of a personalistic outsider who mobilizes voters with an anti-establishment appeal – is a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Lacking experience with representative democratic institutions, possessing an electoral mandate to destroy the existing elite, and facing institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by that elite, populists have an incentive to launch plebiscitary attacks on institutions of horizontal accountability. Where they succeed, weak democracies almost invariably slide into competitive authoritarianism. The argument is demonstrated through a comparative analysis of all 14 elected presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010.

The Media’s Role in Fighting Corruption

This study measures the relationship between media freedom and corruption, accounting for elements of vertical accountability (electoral competitiveness, civil society, and voter turnout) and horizontal accountability (judicial independence and political system). Results suggest a strong association between media freedom and corruption that runs from high levels of media freedom to low levels of corruption. This study also implies that media freedom might have a stronger indirect effect on corruption when coupled with powerful institutions of horizontal accountability. The data suggest that the association between media freedom and corruption is strongest in countries with parliamentary systems than in those with presidential systems, and that this impact amplifies as the judiciary independence increases.

Democratic Consolidation in East Asia

In this article, we attempt to describe how ordinary people in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan view democracy and its authoritarian alternatives and how they experience institutional practices of their democracies to determine the extent of cultural and institutional democratization. The analysis of the 2006 AsiaBarometer Survey data shows that although the citizens of East Asian democracies unequivocally reject military authoritarian rule, they are ambivalent toward civilian authoritarian rule, and are not yet fully committed to democracy. The analysis also shows that they are not satisfied with the provision of civil rights and institutions of horizontal accountability, but remain highly satisfied with voting rights, which suggests that East Asian democracies are not adequately liberal, though unmistakably electoral, in the eyes of ordinary people. On the basis of this finding, we conclude that East Asian democracies fail to achieve a high-level equilibrium between the popular demand for democracy and the institutional supply of democracy.

The Authoritarian Executive? Horizontal and Vertical Accountability in Nicaragua

This article uses empirical evidence from Nicaragua to examine Guillermo O'Donnell's argument that new democracies often become undemocratic delegative democracies and that vertical accountability is not enough to stop such encroaching authoritarianism. While events in the last five years have focused attention on illegal executive behavior by former president Aleman, Nicaragua's democracy actually has experienced authoritarian presidencies under all the major parties. Elections and popular mobilization have strengthened the independence of the legislature, however. Mechanisms of vertical accountability thereby have proven more effective than expected in restraining executive authoritarianism and fostering institutions of horizontal accountability. The case of Nicaragua shows that citizens can use the power balance and separate institutional mandate of presidential democracy to limit authoritarianism.

The Authoritarian Executive? Horizontal and Vertical Accountability in Nicaragua

AbstractThis article uses empirical evidence from Nicaragua to examine Guillermo O'Donnell's argument that new democracies often become undemocratic delegative democracies and that vertical accountability is not enough to stop such encroaching authoritarianism. While events in the last five years have focused attention on illegal executive behavior by former president Alemán, Nicaragua's democracy actually has experienced authoritarian presidencies under all the major parties. Elections and popular mobilization have strengthened the independence of the legislature, however. Mechanisms of vertical accountability thereby have proven more effective than expected in restraining executive authoritarianism and fostering institutions of horizontal accountability. The case of Nicaragua shows that citizens can use the power balance and separate institutional mandate of presidential democracy to limit authoritarianism.

The Rule of Law as Transition to Democracy in China

This paper assesses Pan Wei's proposal for a 'consultative rule of law system' for China, finding it a potentially important step along the path of political reform. China urgently needs political reform to deal with the rapidly mounting problems of corruption, abuse of power, financial scandals, rising crime and inequality, and declining legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. A rule of law, with an independent judiciary and other autonomous institutions of horizontal accountability, is vital if China is to rein in these problems and deliver better, fairer, more transparent and effective governance. However, Pan Wei's proposed system goes only part of the way toward addressing the deficiencies of governance in China, and is therefore best viewed as a transitional framework. To work, horizontal accountability must be supplemented with and reinforced by vertical account ability, through competitive elections, which give local officials an incentive to serve the public good and enable bad officials to be removed by the people. Ultimately, I argue, China can only achieve adequate and enduring political accountability by moving toward democracy. Among the other issues addressed in the paper are the architecture and appointment of a system of horizontal accountability for China; the role of the Communist Party (or its successor hegemon) in a 'rule of law' system; and the timing and phasing of the transition to a rule of law.